PRIVATE EQUITY, INVESTMENT AND FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS: FIRM-LEVEL EVIDENCE FOR FRANCE AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
Session Corporate Governance I
Session ChairTBA

Presenter(s) Joel Stiebale, RWI Essen
Co-Author(s) Dirk Engel, University of Applied Sciences Stralsund
Keywords Corporate Governance, Financial Constraints, Investment and Private Equity
JEL Codes D92, G23, G32

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The welfare effects of private equity transactions are debated controversially. We analyze the impact of expansion financing and buyouts by private equity investors on investment of portfolio firms in the U.K. and France. Unobserved heterogeneity and the endogeneity of private equity transactions financed by venture capitalists are addressed using dynamic panel data techniques. In both countries we find that portfolio firms display higher investment levels and a lower dependence on internal funds after expansion financing. Buyouts financed by venture capitalists are neither associated with a decrease in investment spending nor with an increase in the dependence on internal finance.

 
When & Where
Thu 3 Sep 2009
14:00 - 15:30
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